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Exploiting emerging market complementarities: Delayed, then accelerated 
internationalisation in a technology EMNE 
 
Structured Abstract  
Purpose: The paper explores the delayed, then accelerated internationalisation of an emerging 
multinational enterprise (EMNE), with a particular focus on the media technology sector, and how 
it exploited complementarities between emerging markets. 
Design/methodology/approach: The research is qualitative in nature and focuses on the expansion 
of a South African media technology EMNE case study that has a footprint in over 130 countries 
and has one of the largest market capitalisations of any media company outside the US and China.  
Findings: EMNEs have unique capabilities in navigating uncertain institutional environments in 
emerging markets and are able to capitalise upon the institutional complementarities between their 
home and host countries. This may facilitate the recognition of market opportunities and the 
harnessing of new technologies to meet these opportunities in complementary markets for 
accelerated internationalisation. 
Practical implications: EMNEs must capitalise upon th  institutional complementarities between 
home and host country locations and use this to take advantage of identified market opportunities. 
This creates the possibility for a process of accelerated internationalisation. New technologies are 
creating particular market opportunities in emerging markets which can be exploited by EMNEs. 
Originality/value: We provide a framework which illustrates how an EMNE can exploit 
complementarities between emerging markets to identify market opportunities, capitalise upon 
institutional similarities, and harness new technologies in the process.  
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Introduction 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) internationalising into emerging markets often find themselves 
having to contend with dual disadvantages, namely, coping with uncertain institutional 
environments and a product set that may not align with local market conditions. Emerging MNEs 
(EMNEs) are thought to possess certain advantages in emerging market contexts both because 
they may be more familiar with these types of institutional milieus and because their products and 
technologies may be better suited to these markets. Whilst the focus of MNE expansion has 
traditionally been on leveraging inherent firm or country-specific advantages (Bhaumik, Driffield, 
and Zhou, 2015; Hillemann and Gestrin, 2016), in emerging markets additional factors have been 
emphasised especially concerning the complexity of their institutional environments (Ahmadjian, 
2016; Luiz and Ruplal, 2013; Narula and Kodiyat, 2016; Pananond, 2015).  EMNEs do not have 
the benefit of coming from home countries with mature institutional and governance 
environments afforded to traditional MNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008) and rather come 
from economies characterised by weaker institutions and turbulence (Luiz et al., 2017; Marquis 
and Raynard, 2014). Despite this, EMNEs have accelerated their expansion to both advanced and 
emerging countries (Bandeira-de-Mello, Fleury, Aveline, and Gama, 2016; Contractor, Lahiri, 
Elango, and Kundu, 2014). This has led Guillén and García-Canal’s to ask (2009, p. 25) “why 
have they (EMNEs) been able to expand abroad at dizzying speed, in defiance of the conventional 
wisdom about the virtues of a staged, incremental approach to international expansion”, without a 
definitive response. 
The purpose of this research is to explore the accelerated internationalisation of an EMNE, 
with a particular focus on the media technology sector, and how it exploited complementarities 
between emerging markets. The case of Naspers is particularly interesting, not only because it is 
one of the largest media companies in the world, and perhaps surprisingly is based in South 
Africa, but also because of its dominance within emerging markets and its major shareholdings of 
internet giant Tencent in China (33%) and Mail.Ru which is the largest internet business in Russia 
through its 100% ownership of MIH. We focus on the role that institutional factors have played in 
facilitating its internationalisation, identifying market opportunities, and harnessing particular 
technologies to internationalise in an accelerated manner. We use the term “accelerated 
internationalisation” even though the company took several decades before it started its 
internationalisation process but once the internationalisation began, it did so in an accelerated 
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manner reaching a footprint of 130 countries within two decades. It would therefore more 
accurately be described as delayed, then accelerated internationalisation. 
Whilst research has shown that institutional environments can augment an EMNE’s 
unique ability to expand internationally (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2017; Gammeltoft, Barnard, and 
Madhok, 2010; Gammeltoft, Pradhan, and Goldstein, 2010), there have been calls to contextualise 
these institutional factors as research has also found disadvantages for EMNEs associated with 
their weak domestic institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2015; Liou, Chao, and Yang, 
2016; Narula and Kodiyat, 2016). We argue that EMNEs have distinctive capabilities in 
navigating uncertain institutional environments in emerging markets and are able to capitalise 
upon the institutional complementarities between their home and host countries. This provides 
them with insight into market opportunities and the embracing of new technologies can enable the 
exploitation of these opportunities in an accelerated process of internationalisation. We thus 
contribute to the understanding of how home country institutional environments affect the nature, 
timing, and location choices of internationalising EMNEs, and the synergies and 
complementarities between home and host country institutional settings. This provides nuance to 
research on the Uppsala model. We also contribute to the literature on accelerated 
internationalisation of EMNEs by contextualising that acceleration from a home country 
institutional perspective. Furthermore, we demonstrate the role of new technologies in allowing 
for the identification and exploitation of new market opportunities in emerging markets, which 
enables this accelerated internationalisation. We demonstrate how a technology EMNE is able to 
leverage off its vast platform both technologically and geographically to facilitate 
internationalisation and growth elsewhere on the platform. 
Literature review 
The internationalisation of EMNEs 
The Uppsala school (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) argues that internationalisation occurs 
gradually through incremental resource commitments to foreign markets as firms learn about new 
locations.  But increasingly questions are being asked about whether internationalisation can 
happen at an accelerated pace with alternative forms of learning, such as through partnerships in 
joint ventures (Buckley and Casson, 2009), isomorphism (Salomon and Wu, 2012), and 
acquisition (Buckley et al., 2016). Johanson and Vahlne (2009, 2013) also updated their theory to 
address network capabilities which allows for learning, dynamic capabilities, and mitigating tough 
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institutional aspects of host environments. The main criticism leveraged against the Uppsala 
school, when considering its appropriateness for EMNE expansion, is its inadequacies when 
exploring the speed of EMNE internationalisation (Gammeltoft, et al., 2010; Guillén and García-
Canal, 2009; Thite et al., 2015).  Mathews (2006) argues that EMNEs rarely engage in a path 
dependent and evolutionary strategy, and that there is little support for a staged 
internationalisation to psychically close markets initially only to evade the liability of foreignness. 
Gammeltoft, Barnard and Madhok note (2010, p.96) EMNEs are “internationalising in a different 
era, with different starting points and possibly very different internationalisation patterns and 
paths”, and therefore there is scepticism as to whether traditional models cover the nuances of 
EMNEs. 
The question of whether EMNEs require a distinct theory to support their 
internationalisation has been termed the Goldilocks debate by Cuervo-Cazurra (2012) with three 
views: firstly, EMNEs require new theory to describe their internationalisation strategy; secondly, 
no new theory is required to explain their internationalisation strategies; and finally, existing 
theory can be extended to accommodate the global rise of EMNEs. For example, Rugman (2009) 
argues that EMNEs exploit home country specific advantages (CSAs) when internationalising as 
they do not have significant firm specific advantages (FSAs) to be competitive in foreign host 
markets, whilst Buckley et al. (2016) debate this because it fails to explain how the CSAs 
available to all firms can sustainability be leveraged in international expansion.  
What is increasingly recognised is the importance of the particular institutional context of 
emerging markets and the impact that that may have on internationalisation. In general emerging 
markets are characterised by more uncertain and weaker institutional milieus (often termed 
institutional voids) - where the rules of the game are ambiguous, infrastructure is lacking, 
transaction costs are high, and market counterparts have to find ways of transacting without the 
supporting institutions and the inefficiencies that that raises (Luiz and Stephan, 2012). These 
voids have been recognised as both push and pull factors within internationalisation. As regards 
the former, weak institutions are seen as stimuli for EMNEs to look to OFDI as an option to 
mitigate the transaction costs of their domestic market (Barnard and Luiz, 2018; Buckley et al., 
2007; Mingo et al., 2018).  And Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) motivates that home country conditions, 
such as political uncertainty, violence, pro-market reforms and reversals, and geographic isolation 
can drive a firm to escape the domestic conditions.   
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Buckley et al. (2016) state that despite having built up the necessary financial resources, 
many EMNEs lack the competitive FSAs in marketing, managerial skills and technological 
expertise and therefore pushed internationally to address these deficits through acquisition (also 
see Luo and Tung, 2007). This implies that EMNEs are given an internationalisation jolt to escape 
domestic conditions and seek new advantages which would suggest that EMNEs expand to 
stronger institutional environments or what Luiz et al. (2017) term institutional substitution. On 
the other hand, the domestic institutional environment can also provide EMNEs with advantages 
particularly when moving into other emerging markets as their knowledge of operating in 
institutional uncertainty can provide them with a competitive advantage - a form of institutional 
complementarity (Luiz et al., 2017).  
Our case study allows us to explore this debate as to the nature and process of 
internationalisation of EMNEs and whether they follow an incremental or an accelerated pattern, 
and the role of host and home country institutions in affecting the location and the broader pattern 
of internationalisation. In the case of Naspers, we demonstrate how the company utilised its 
understanding of emerging markets’ institutional and market complementarities, based upon its 
South African home country experience, to accelerate its internationalisation by exploiting new 
technologies. 
Disruptive innovation as a source of internationalisation for EMNEs 
Emerging economies are experiencing rapidly changing market conditions as a result of growing 
and changing demand and rising income levels. High growth is creating new market opportunities 
but these opportunities may be influenced by the particular characteristics of emerging markets 
and thus may be better aligned to EMNEs (Rui, Cuervo-Cazurra, and Un, 2016). Furthermore, 
changing global market structures, accompanied by fast-changing technologies, implies that firms 
increasingly need to adapt to changes in industry structures. This can be compounded in emerging 
markets where a new subset of consumers have specific needs requiring adaptation of legacy 
offerings to new markets, or innovative new product development appropriate for such markets 
(Agnihotri, 2015). In some sectors, new technologies are creating new market opportunities and 
possible disruption which may be better aligned to emerging market contexts. 
Disruptive innovation relates to existing business models and networks of value being 
upset by innovations that lead to discontinuous change (Bower and Christensen, 1995; Kriz and 
Welch, 2018).  In the emerging market context, MNEs need to invest in technologies that can 
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support the future growth potential of the host market (Christensen, 1997), but these markets and 
industries may not necessarily have been proven yet.  New technologies in emerging markets can 
exacerbate risk for MNEs and thus their operations may require business models to be 
fundamentally reassessed (Ramamurti and Singh, 2009).  Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000) argue that 
firms that are able to assess the need and potential of new technology adoption are able to create 
business models with a global vision before the scale is obviously viable. In the context of 
disruptive innovation in emerging markets, EMNEs can capture markets by determining which 
technologies can align with the needs of the market. The result is a complex situation for MNEs 
looking to enter emerging economies as they need to consider the market’s institutional variables, 
their organisational makeup, and their internal capabilities for absorbing local technology and 
catering to host needs (Wu et al., 2016; Lynch and Jin, 2016).  Qiu and Fan (2013, p. 39) write 
that “as emerging markets are becoming drivers of fundamental and disruptive innovation, it 
involves not just redesigning products but also rethinking (the) entire business system.”  
If EMNEs can target markets with new technology products, and later leverage those 
innovations into existing markets (Lynch and Jin, 2016), there is an opportunity to generate rapid 
growth (Thite et al., 2015). By augmenting, transferring and leveraging technologies within their 
broader network, EMNEs can tailor their solutions to target disruptive technologies to offer a 
localised product fit, and to leverage growth to other emerging markets in an accelerated manner 
with limited competition. Those firms that are both open to utilizing innovation and absorbing 
potential failures are better positioned to capitalise on internationalisation opportunities that 
weaker institutional ecosystems offer (Lynch and Jin, 2016). Therefore, by pursuing strategic 
assets in dynamic emerging markets, EMNEs have the potential to build a competitively 
advantageous position where other businesses are not willing to venture.  
Our case study lends itself to an analysis of how innovation and technologies can be used 
to identify new market opportunities in emerging markets and thereby to expedite 
internationalisation into these markets. Furthermore, EMNEs may have particular advantages in 
recognising the opportunities that this presents in other emerging markets because of the benefit 
of complementarity between home and host countries. The country of origin influences may 
strengthen the exploitation of emerging market complementarities by EMNEs and may thereby 
provide them with unique capabilities that they can exploit. 
Research methodology 
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A case study methodology was used to gain an in-depth understanding of the research question. 
By utilising a retrospective view of the EMNE the research provides insight into how 
internationalisation strategies have morphed, adapted to business model innovations, and 
integrated disruptive aspects of institutional environments and technologies as the business 
expanded. 
The opportunity that a single case study such as Naspers presents is a deeper insight into 
accelerated expansion internationally within the broader dynamic ecosystem (Siggelkow, 2007). 
Seventeen senior managers were interviewed - all of whom were intimately involved with the 
launching, expansion, and growth into international markets and were key decision-makers in this 
process (see Table 1). To maintain personal confidentiality, the respondents were assigned 
numbers from 1 to 17, and the table provides detail regarding their position, the relationship with 
the parent group, and where their businesses operate. Interviews were recorded with permission 
and transcribed before thematic coding was applied – discussed below. In addition to the 
interviews, sources of archival evidence were integrated into the research, including archived 
company information, and information from reports and databases to provide a broader 
perspective of the phenomena and to provide additional verification to the interviews. The 
interviews themselves were conducted between July and December of 2016. 
Insert table 1 here 
A semi-structured interview process was used with an open-ended interview guide and the 
benefit of this process is that it offers the opportunity to examine core themes but allows for richer 
analysis with the ability to clarify answers and elaborate on contextually relevant aspects of the 
case. Using archival data and company reports we tracked the events of the firm’s 
internationalisation in a chronological format and this retroactive longitudinal analysis allowed 
the internationalisation process to be tracked (Yin, 2011), and provided the opportunity to 
integrate questions that could explore the themes of the research into a semi-structured format. 
The thematic codification enabled relevant information to be linked to the theoretical concepts of 
internationalisation, emerging markets, institutional environments, and disruptive innovation in 
the study. This iterative process echoes that promoted by Yin (2011) who notes that qualitative 
data moves through a process of compiling, disassembling, reassembling, interpreting, and 
concluding.  The thematic coding and analysis of data was processed in the following manner, as 
proposed by Creswell (2013).  After the interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim, the 
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text of each interview was segmented and coded into primary themes around emerging 
institutional markets, accelerated internationalisation, disruptive innovation, and market 
gaps/competition. The texts were then further analysed to uncover secondary codes that could be 
related to primary themes. These codes were then analysed further and where overlap and 
redundancy were identified, codes were bucketed together to form a third category of reduced 
themes, which were specific to the business researched, but grouped into relevant data sources to 
be evaluated and interpreted in relation to the literature. Table 6 provides a summary of the key 
thematic codes which emerged together with illustrative quotes from respondents and is further 
discussed below. 
The research integrity was maintained throughout by documenting each process and by 
using open questions to allow respondents to tell their experiences and to allow for maximum 
transparency. The entire research was documented and interactions between the various 
respondents were replicated in as consistent a manner as possible (Yin, 2011). After transcribing, 
respondents were asked to check the contents and ensure that it accurately captured their stories 
and responses and we were able to ask additional questions of clarification. To increase the 
credibility of the research, external sources were used to triangulate interviews and the findings of 
the research, such as archival material, company reports, media publications, and financial 
reports. 
Research findings and discussion 
Background to the company and respondents 
Naspers was formed in 1915, when Die Burger, a daily newspaper was launched by the future 
President of South Africa J.B.M Hertzog.  The business expanded into magazines in 1916, before 
moving into Pay-TV in 1985, and internet services in 1997.  At the turn of the millennium, 
Naspers began an aggressive expansion into BRIC nations, before entering additional emerging 
markets in the latter part of the decade.  Table 2 highlights key chronological dates related to 
investments in new technologies and countries for Naspers since its launch in 1915. We see four 
distinct phases in its expansion. In phase 1 from 1915 until the early 1990s, it is a South African 
focused media company growing organically by expanding its newspaper and magazine offerings 
resulting in it dominating the local market. This was facilitated by its close relationship with the 
apartheid government together with the lack of competition in the domestic market.  
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In the 1980s it is the first company to embrace pay satellite television in Africa, initially in 
South Africa only, before commencing phase 2 which sees its Greenfields international expansion 
into neighbouring countries and then into the rest of sub Saharan Africa becoming the largest 
player in this market on the continent.  
In 1997, three momentous events occurred for the company. First, Naspers journalists 
apologised formally for their role in defending apartheid, which proved to be a turning point on its 
chequered history. Second, Koos Bekker was appointed CEO of Naspers (moving from its pay 
TV division), and third, the company launched internet services, which was the start of its 
diversification even further from its origins in print. Phase 3 sees it becoming the dominant 
Internet service provider in South Africa and utilising this experience in recognising the 
opportunities in new media technologies in similar emerging markets and rapidly expanding into 
an emerging market media giant. Some of its most notable investments included a 33% ownership 
in Tencent in China (2001) which has rapidly established itself as one of the largest Internet and 
technology companies, as well gaming and social media companies in the world, and similar 
stakes in 2006 in Mail.ru which has become the largest Internet services company in Russia, and 
Editora Abril which is a major Brazilian publisher and printing company and one of the biggest 
media holdings in Latin America (besides some of the largest local magazines, it also holds the 
Brazilian editions of Disney comics, Cosmopolitan, Men's Health, Women's Health, Runner's 
World, Playboy, Brazilian MTV, etc.). In 2012 it completed its dominance of the BRICS 
countries with a 16% stake in Flipkart in India which is the country’s biggest online store in the 
electronic commerce sector. (In 2018 it sold its share in Flipkart to Walmart for $2.2 billion 
netting a $1.6 billion profit from the sale of its stake in the process.) Phase 4 sees the company 
moving into the USA by backing new educational technology companies with worldwide 
ambitions. These phases were affected by developments in its home country of South Africa and 
this is further unpacked below – also see Table 5. 
Naspers listed in 1994 at R17.50 a share and rose rapidly reaching over R3,800 a share in 
January 2018, making it one of the best performers on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
over this time period. Its revenue distribution by industry segment and geography are presented in 
table 3 which illustrate a shift away from traditional media segments towards the Internet, and 
geographically away from South Africa. By 2016 Naspers had a footprint across 130 countries, 
with annual revenues of close to $7 billion and an operating profit of around $150 million per 
annum. Its market capitalisation makes it one of the largest media companies outside the US and 
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China. With the shift away from a traditional media company it reorganised its structure to align 
with the strategic vision of the business “aiming to win locally in a globalizing world” (Naspers, 
2017) and the result is represented in table 4.1 The table demonstrates that as a global platform 
operator it has embraced new digital platforms with the Internet and in particular e-commerce 
making up the bulk of its ecosystem worldwide. The latter includes online classifieds, electronic 
marketplaces, online comparison-shopping, online payment systems and e-money, online travel, 
online gaming, and e-ticketing systems. Furthermore, it has a very substantial positioning in the 
video entertainment sector ranging from satellite television to online streaming, demonstrating its 
exploitation of the development of Internet-based technologies over the past three decades. Lastly, 
it has maintained its presence in the traditional print media although this has been dwarfed by the 
growth of its new media investments. 
Insert tables 2 – 5 here 
Institutional environments and delayed, then accelerated internationalisation  
Under apartheid South Africa was often isolated but post 1994, with the democratic transition, the 
country rapidly reintegrated into the global economy with rapid liberalisation which facilitated the 
internationalisation of South African companies. The institutional environment in South Africa 
was one of uncertainty, change, and instability and this affected the internationalisation of South 
African companies (see Luiz et al., 2017). Barnard and Luiz (2018) demonstrate how 
“institutional misalignment and contestation” resulted in the “stress, strain, and failure” of South 
African institutions and affected both the timing and the location choices of South African 
companies as they internationalised. Table 5 provides a stylised account of key socio-political and 
economic developments in South Africa over the past century which have affected the 
internationalisation pattern and timing of Naspers.  
As already discussed, the company was formed soon after the declaration of the Union of 
South Africa. South Africa’s policy of import substituting industrialisation meant that the 
company was able to focus on the domestic market, which was experiencing rapid growth, largely 
unencumbered by international competition, thereby building up monopolistic advantages. This 
was further facilitated by the country’s isolation during the period of sanctions and disinvestment 
in the 1970s and 1980s. During apartheid, Naspers was able to grow rapidly within the domestic 
economy with a growing portfolio of magazines, newspapers, and printing businesses which 
allowed it to dominate the sector. This generated the initial funding for its moves into new media 
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opportunities as they arose. It recognised the opportunities provided by Pay-TV in 1985, with 
South African television at the time being monopolised by the state broadcasting corporation, and 
Naspers quickly built up a monopoly in this segment.  
As the business grew, the Pay-TV market provided it with a cash-cow and expansion 
started to the north of South Africa with Namibia and Botswana, before numerous additional Sub-
Saharan African countries were entered into in phase 2. South Africa’s transition to democracy in 
the early 1990s facilitated this expansion into Africa as it positioned itself as a gateway into the 
continent. Furthermore, this was accompanied by an economic liberalisation and an easing of 
foreign exchange controls which enabled the internationalisation of South African companies. 
This expansion was initially incremental, deliberate and in line with the Uppsala model but then 
accelerated. By building a monopoly in Pay-TV and by dominating print media during the 
isolationist period, Naspers was able to minimise its expenditure in defending market share and 
building a strong balance sheet.  This financial strength enabled the business to tap into the 
liberalisation post-1994, and expand into emerging markets in an aggressive and well-resourced 
manner.  Furthermore, emerging from this isolationist period, the benefits of targeting 
institutionally difficult environments, where competition was minimal, became a foundation of 
the group’s strategy going forward.  
Phase 3 saw the company target new business models in new territories as it focused on 
the rapidly changing Internet media business and exploited opportunities in emerging economies. 
Presidents Mbeki’s tenure saw the country embracing developing and emerging markets as he 
asserted South Africa’s position as a leader amongst emerging markets. Improved domestic 
conditions saw the country being classified as a high growth potential emerging market and 
resulted in growing links with other emerging markets. 
In 1997 it launched an Internet service provider in South Africa and established itself as a 
leader in the sector. What differentiated its offerings from competitors was its exploitation of the 
full benefits of the Internet platform and the commercialisation of content for which it was able to 
charge a premium. During our interviews it became apparent how this experience in South Africa 
caused it to recognise the opportunities that existed in similar markets. Furthermore, it was not 
afraid to invest in countries with less stable institutions because it understood this environment 
and was able to engage in what Luiz et al. (2017) refer to as an institutional complementarity 
strategy. The view of Naspers was to assess the direction and trend of the institutions rather than 
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where a country’s institutions were at present: “It seems that a lot of the more developed market 
media businesses, are probably quite nervous to go to emerging markets. And I think the fact that, 
Naspers grew up in an emerging market and had to find ways to develop business models under 
very difficult situations that probably a lot of first world businesses wouldn't have ever come 
across. [They] were probably too frightened to go into those territories, which is probably what 
made Naspers so successful. Going into areas where other people, others fear to tread” 
(Respondent 5). 
Naspers entered all four BRIC markets in the 2000s, which were often deemed too risky 
by international competitors.  The lure of high growth provided the initial pull, and their 
knowledge of weak institutional environments allowed them to mitigate risk. This was facilitated 
by South Africa’s growing interconnection with other emerging markets as a deliberate policy of 
President Mbeki. Furthermore, the relatively unattractive institutional environment minimised 
largescale competition and provided entry barriers to Western players. Respondents argued that 
Naspers had a greater appetite for risk than foreign players because of its home environment 
which provided understanding of such institutional uncertainty whilst this was unattractive to 
competitors and thereby minimised competition during its expansion phase: “There are a lot of 
parallels between these countries that you can draw on and there's some very obvious reasons 
why some businesses would work in the country (Respondent 9). “I think there definitely is an 
advantage coming out of emerging market, you start to understand what those emerging market 
problems are and how to overcome them. And you go into one difficult territory and may learn a 
lot of things about yourself and about, and about the business, from that experience” (Respondent 
9). 
The parallels between South Africa and the BRIC emerging markets, mentioned by 
respondents, which made Naspers more willing to enter these countries and to recognise the 
opportunities included: 1) the rapidly growing middle class and high income groups in these 
countries which together with rising levels of education resulted in the demand for more choices 
and new products; 2) the lack of foreign competition in these markets associated with them being 
relatively closed in prior decades; 3) the nature of the institutional environment associated with its 
understanding of economies transitioning and liberalising which gave Naspers an advantage. 
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We find support for the notion that the weaker institutional home ecosystems gave Naspers a 
competitive advantage to accelerate to similarly weak environments (capitalising upon 
institutional complementarity) and to capitalise upon the resulting lack of competition. 
Respondent 2: “Treat it as an opportunity with limited competition because other people won't 
come over the wall. … There is no competition, if you have the knowledge that nobody else has 
there is no competition.” 
Respondent 4: “Russia and China respectively, massive growth markets and Russia, also, a very 
large market and underserved market because of its isolationist past. So in some instances both of 
those geographies are a little bit similar to South Africa, they were not states that were part of the 
world community. They weren't served as well as you know other states had been by 
multinationals and as a result they were easier to compete in.” 
The Naspers model is therefore one of capitalising upon complementarities (further 
discussed below in figure 1) between home and host country contexts, both in terms of 
institutional similarities but also in terms of market opportunities which we explore in the next 
section. Its significant international footprint and the breadth of its media platform allowed it to 
leverage from one market to another and from one experience to another in an accelerated 
manner. 
The Naspers strategy continued to be dynamic and in 2015 it decided to invest in the US 
market for the first time with location-based classifieds LetGo, followed the next year by 
significant investments in educational technology companies. Thus Naspers shifted its position of 
an EMNE that solely internationalised into emerging markets, leveraging superior knowledge and 
the ability to navigate weaker institutional environments to a dual approach, of both developed 
and emerging markets (Bandeira-de-Mello et al., 2016): “They (Naspers) get pulled into a country 
because of an opportunity and if they recognise that hey this is a problem we also see in other 
markets then it could become a push vehicle into other markets. It always starts with a pull and 
depending on the model, or the outcome of whatever the product, or business model, after reviews 
it could become a push for you going to other markets” (Respondent 13).  
The South African economy under President Zuma deteriorated rapidly as did the 
institutional environment which may have contributed to the search for greater institutional 
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stability in its portfolio of investments as represented by developed markets and what Luiz et al. 
(2017) term an institutional substitution strategy. 
Disruptive innovation and market opportunities in complementary emerging markets 
By focusing on emerging markets, Naspers was able to exploit complementarities between its 
home and host countries and this facilitated its recognition of new market prospects and the 
impact that new technologies would have on the media space. As it experimented with fresh 
technologies in new media in its home country, it was able to develop products and services 
geared to these institutional conditions and emerging consumers. Furthermore, it recognised the 
same conditions and opportunities in other emerging markets and made investments abroad to 
capitalise upon these similarities. We demonstrate how it was able to do so by investing in like-
minded companies and exploit its vast emerging market footprint and implement the learnings 
from one market into another reinforcing the process. Our research supports the proposition that 
“conditions of the country of origin influence learning-by-doing” (Rui, Cuervo-Cazurra, and Un, 
2016, p. 686) and specifically how the characteristics of emerging markets affect this learning 
process. We see Naspers engaging in intense learning-by-doing across its vast footprint of 
businesses, technologies, and geographies and underlining the conclusion that: “Learning emerges 
from creating complementarities in integration, from finding solutions in trial and error, from 
avoiding mistakes in repetition, and from stretching the knowledge base in extension” (Rui, 
Cuervo-Cazurra, and Un, 2016, p. 697). 
We highlight three particular areas of complementarity that were important enablers of the 
Naspers model which partly account for why it was able to gain such a dominant emerging market 
footprint in an accelerated manner. Firstly, its recognition of the complementarity of emerging 
markets; secondly, its exploitation of disruptive technologies to capitalise upon these 
complementarities; and lastly, the entrepreneurial nature of the company and its attraction to like-
minded companies with strong entrepreneurial teams. 
Both the Naspers operational model and its investment strategy are firmly rooted in its 
experience of emerging markets and this has driven its product offerings and its investment in 
particular technologies and local companies. Furthermore, its experiences, both successes and 
failures, continuously feedback into both its operational and investment models by internalising 
learnings. (We elaborate on this further in figure 1.) It creates platforms for its subsidiaries to 
leverage off the experience and knowledge of other companies by encouraging the idea of the 
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Naspers network as an ecosystem. Subsidiaries have access to the knowledge and expertise of any 
other part of the multinational: “So, it's more than just money that I think enabled these 
businesses but also shared resources and shared insights and shared benchmarks and best 
practice and things that made it possible” (Respondent 9). 
The portfolio nature of Naspers enables businesses to piggyback off the larger operational 
models and the facilitation of entry into the market has the benefit of minimising expenditure and 
driving scale. For example, the country manager of a Naspers’ Fintech subsidiary specialising in 
online payment services highlighted the benefits of being part of the Naspers network and focused 
on the fact that it was able to leverage off a larger Naspers subsidiary such as MultiChoice, which 
is the largest Pay-TV and Internet company in Africa: “I think we have got a very good close 
relationship with the MultiChoice.  MultiChoice has a very big footprint in Africa, so we leverage 
off that footprint and their relationships to look at opportunities in this market” (Respondent 8). 
Not only has this been instrumental to its operational model, it has also led to enhanced 
investment strategies where Naspers has taken equity in a company and its subsidiaries have 
followed suit and made similar investments in those companies. For example, whilst Naspers was 
an early investor in the Indian Internet start-up Flipkart, in 2017 Tencent supported this 
investment with its own $700 million investment in the company utilising its knowledge within 
Naspers. This knowledge share enables the Naspers ecosystem to gain insights about markets, 
market opportunities, and business innovation: “We pretty much have access to anything that 
anyone does at any given time and that knowledge is shared globally and quite quickly as well 
upon request, so I think that sort of umbrella mentality where yes we trust local markets to 
perform but we are also fast in sharing learnings amongst the market is what makes it unique” 
(Respondent 11). “I think coming from an emerging market playbook, there is that level of 
understanding because the lessons are on the ground every day” (Respondent 10). 
As regards the second enabler, involving disruptive technologies, despite Naspers not 
necessarily generating specific disruptive technology itself, the business was able to adapt 
innovations in other developed markets into emerging markets that had not yet been influenced by 
such innovations.  This was seen through the early introduction of Pay-TV, digital classifieds, and 
more lately investments in FinTech and EduTech. The respondents underlined that the ability to 
accelerate in emerging markets was due to the sharing of knowledge across its markets and 
platforms.  Disruptive innovations enabled new business models and new market shares to be 
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created in emerging markets. With the focus on creating traction, Naspers has been able to scale 
businesses in an accelerated fashion. It was stressed by respondents that merely copying and 
pasting an innovative technology from one geography to another did not lead to accelerated 
expansion, but rather it was important that each technology had an element of customisation to 
suit the nuances of a new territory, its institutions, and customer base. 
As the business has witnessed first-hand how the media industry has been disrupted by 
new technologies, the mindset of senior management in the business is to consistently reassess 
how their business models may be disrupted and by what - generating intense curiosity about 
potential sources of change (Garrison, Harvey, and Napier, 2008). 
Respondent 10: “One of the core values in the Naspers group that has led to its success now, is its 
continual strive and drive t  adopt new technology and embrace technology into the future. That 
requires a continual cycle of i novation and self-disruption … The culture of innovation is key - 
management team that has a future focused approach and an entrepreneurial spirit and an 
openness and willingness to challenge the status quo.” 
Respondent 12: “I think it is a necessity to keep thinking of what will disrupt you.” 
Respondent 14: “We need to constantly reassess. … the whole substance of this is innovation.” 
Respondent 8: “… if you are not agile, you die.” 
Perhaps the most practical example of Naspers willing to embrace disruption as a catalyst 
to expedite growth is the manner in which the business has created internal competition and 
disruption.  This follows on from the tenants of the Darwinism that Koos Bekker (Naspers 
Chairman) is fond of referencing.  Having seen first-hand how the digital and classifieds 
industries disrupted the once monolithic print industry, Naspers has been quick to assess what the 
threats on the horizon could be and to adapt their business models accordingly.  This has resulted 
in the company creating internal businesses that cannibalise their current market share with the 
view that in the long term the newer technologies will surpass the legacy businesses and secure 
markets for Naspers. Examples of this are the streaming service Showmax which competes 
directly with the Pay-TV operation MultiChoice, and LetGo, the mobile-only classifieds app, 
which competes with OLX, the digital classifieds multi-national.  Tencent, as another example, 
have teams working on the same products, and whoever creates the better product gets the 
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recognition internally which carries a lot of weight in the business: “Tencent is creating healthy 
internal competition, and it’s been good for the company because it's allowed the fire in a better 
race of innovation to take place and its improved multiple products” (Respondent 17). And the 
benefits of this approach was expressed more generally as follows: “Cannibalisation is a mature 
way to look at the adopted model in the sense that it almost brings the need to adopt much more 
forward-looking options into the planning of the business environment.  You know, they are not 
mutually exclusive but the one is probably a more pragmatic approach to business” (Respondent 
10). 
Naspers considers market share as an important barrier to competition.  The isolationist 
period in South Africa provided a glimpse into the power of a monopolistic-like business and the 
ability to create a high barrier of entry to businesses.  Therefore, when Naspers started to assess 
markets prime for entering, emerging markets not only ticked the boxes in terms of the macro 
variables, but also because they had minimal international competitors with potential first mover 
advantage.  The strategic view of the business is that if one can enter a market, gain traction and 
scale the business to “own” the market, it is far easier to continue an accelerated expansion as it 
experienced in its home country.  This, in turn, has been the result of being agile and flexible and 
disrupting from within and committing resources to new innovations even if they disrupt existing 
market segments: “We have to compete with ourselves as the consumers migrate, from one 
(business to) another, so that they're migrating between Naspers businesses rather than them 
migrating to a competitor” (Respondent 1). 
The experience of Naspers yields two conclusions regarding its success in deploying new 
technologies in emerging markets. First, it has been more adaptable to uncertain ecosystems, 
based upon its experience in its home country, and therefore has created a competitive advantage 
in being flexible enough to adjust solutions to emerging market needs. Second, it has proactively 
targeted and disrupted industries in emerging markets to minimise direct competition and build up 
entry barriers. 
The final enabler of complementary markets we identified is its entrepreneurial nature and 
its attraction to like-minded companies in similar markets. The entrepreneurial character of 
Naspers builds on the nature of the founder of the modern company, Koos Bekker, and his belief 
in betting on innovative companies with entrepreneurial management teams. This has been his 
strategy in not only building up its South African, but also its worldwide, footprint. As a result, 
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the company has betted on the management teams of its investments and has given them the 
flexibility in structure and operations to leverage learnings from other portfolio players in the 
same markets. This reinforces the argument of Verbeke and Yuan (2016, p.185) that MNE 
subsidiary capabilities can be enhanced in high distance contexts as the parent company may need 
to “reduce its level of process control and rely more on outcome control, to reduce the risk of 
imposing inflexible processes and standards on subsidiaries and stifling requisite local adaptation” 
whilst at the same time taking advantage of the FSAs and CSAs within the overall MNE portfolio. 
Respondent 11: “Naspers always trusted local entrepreneurs to deliver on local problems which I 
think is part of the DNA of the company so all investment made also has sort of a tag along with it 
that says we trust the local market to know the best how to operate and navigate local 
circumstance.” 
A theme of backing strong founding teams with excellent knowledge appeared repeatedly 
in responses. The motivation and strategic relevance of backing local entrepreneurs has been 
interwoven into the business since the expansion into China. This enables Naspers to navigate 
new regions and get first hand insight into difficult institutional environments from local 
entrepreneurs. Relying on local teams also mitigates the potential sources of conflict that may 
arise between the parent company and subsidiaries when the latter feel undermined in their 
activities (Lauring et al., 2017). Businesses therefore have a smoother transition into new markets, 
and in parallel, Naspers is able to navigate emerging markets, in an expedited fashion, through 
localised knowledge: “It was about identifying entrepreneurs in their markets who understood the 
market well and were able to execute in those particular markets” (Respondent 4). For example, 
when asked about the initial Tencent investment and what drew Naspers to the company, 
respondent 17 replied: “What we really did like, is that there was quite a tightly lead founder 
team, it wasn't just one individual but several founders, young, who really understood the Chinese 
market.  Very hungry, a change model. Let’s back these guys, step away from operations 
completely, and let them do the running and that was the model that proved in China to be very 
successful for us.” 
A final point worth highlighting is the self-reinforcing nature of the exploitation of these 
complementarities. Not only did it learn from its home country knowledge to internationalise into 
complementary emerging markets and exploit the institutional and market similarities and new 
technologies for accelerated internationalisation, but it learnt from its experiences and its 
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investments and fed these back into the overall model reinforcing its advantages through a 
learning process. Naspers was quick to learn from its mistakes and the introspective nature of this 
line of thought is integrated into the business DNA and comes from the very top with Koos 
Bekker, the Chairman of Naspers, continuously highlighting the manner in which a business 
needs to consistently reinvent itself in a Darwinian fashion, as he is quoted saying below: “We’ve 
made more mistakes than anyone else. The benefit of a mistake is that you know what doesn’t 
work. What we typically try to do is get into something and ‘fail fast and cheaply’. We have also 
failed expensively. … We’ve failed quite a lot but if you’re going to fail, get into the market 
quickly, fail quickly and learn from it. Since then we have learnt a few lessons” (Koos Bekker in 
Atagana, 2011). 
Insert table 6 about here 
Conclusion 
How did a South African company come to dominate the new media and Internet sectors in major 
parts of the emerging markets and invest in what were to become leading players within each of 
the BRICS? Our research points to several facets which can explain both its locational choices in 
terms of its internationalisation and its recognition of the opportunities provided by the Internet 
media sector.  
First, the institutional home context of South Africa provided Naspers with certain country 
specific advantages which it was able to capitalise upon by choosing to internationalise into 
similar emerging markets – theme 1 from table 6. The isolated nature of its home country allowed 
it to experiment with new media (initially Pay-TV and then the Internet) and to do so relatively 
protected from competition – theme 2. It disrupted existing ISPs by providing a full service with 
the commercialisation of content and launching online selling platforms early on. Furthermore, 
operating in environments of institutional instability and uncertainty was part of business in South 
Africa and this meant that it was more willing to bet on the new emerging markets when others 
were more risk averse. 
Second, Naspers transitioned out of post-apartheid South Africa with an entrepreneurial 
and innovative culture led by a relatively young CEO with an entrepreneurial mindset. This has 
seen the company take chances on new geographies (e.g. in Africa when few were betting on the 
continent) and in new technologies. 
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Third, after being internationally dormant for the first six decades of its existence, as 
South Africa transitioned and integrated into the global economy, so the company did likewise. 
From the point at which it commences its internationalisation in 1991 to its current footprint in 
over 130 countries and dominating the emerging market space, we argue that this is an example of 
a delayed, but then accelerated process of internationalisation. We would also venture that this is 
not unique to Naspers and that many other examples of EMNEs have followed similar patterns 
where they have largely been internally focused whilst their host countries have been inward 
looking and following policies of import substituting industrialisation. Witness the rise of EMNEs 
from Latin America post its liberalisation in the late 80s, in India and Turkey from the early 90s, 
and then the more stark examples from the ex-Warsaw group of countries post the collapse of the 
Berlin wall. Whilst their home economies were highly regulated and closed, the firms took 
advantage of the lack of competition and diversified to become large business groups. The 
opening up of these economies and the availability of new technologies in the 1990s allowed them 
to rapidly expand thereafter.  
The case of Naspers demonstrates the particular role played by institutional 
complementarity and the recognition of the opportunities provided by these technologies in 
meeting new consumer possibilities. Figure 1 illustrates how the company took advantage of its 
home country experience and capitalised upon complementarities with other emerging markets in 
terms of institutional environments and market opportunities and exploited technologies that lent 
themselves to these markets. Furthermore, this vast ecosystem (both in terms of geographies and 
media technologies) which it created allowed it to leverage its learning from each investment and 
thereby reinforce its emerging market learning process. Three key propositions emerge from 
figure 1 (left to right) on the internationalization of EMNEs based upon our case study. 
Proposition 1: EMNEs can capitalize upon their knowledge and experience of institutional 
uncertainty in their home country to internationalize into institutionally complementary host 
locations. 
Proposition 2: EMNEs can capitalize upon their knowledge of changing and new consumer needs 
in emerging markets based on their home country experience to identify and exploit new growth 
market opportunities. 
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Proposition 3: The leveraging of institutional complementarities between home and host countries 
and the adoption of new technologies, which allow for the exploitation of market opportunities, 
may enable a process of accelerated internationalization of EMNEs. 
Insert figure 1 here 
Within Naspers, this complementarity extended to the nature of its global platform with 
various parts of the business leveraging off and learning from other parts, and markets off other 
markets – theme 3 from table 6. Its large portfolio structure allowed it to have businesses and 
technologies at different parts of their life cycles with some generating cash and others 
committing to frontier technologies which may yield future growth. Furthermore, as these 
businesses were built on technology infrastructure, the parent firm could accelerate 
internationalisation due to the inherent economies of scale of technology. 
Whilst initially focusing on expanding into emerging markets, Naspers more recently 
made strategic investments in developed markets, particularly the USA, because of its belief that 
it needs to be present in both fast-growing emerging markets, but also where new technologies are 
being created. By leveraging new technologies into market gaps or segments where the business is 
as yet not present, Naspers is looking to disrupt the status quo of market and competitor dynamics 
– theme 4 from table 6. Through its investments in frontier technologies and local entrepreneurs, 
the business is able to identify gaps in the market and if traction is realised, heavily fund that 
traction in order to gain and dominate market share and create barriers to entry, and to look for 
synergies or complementarities with its other markets or businesses. 
EMNEs have distinctive capabilities in navigating uncertain institutional environments in 
emerging markets and are able to capitalise upon the institutional complementarities between their 
home and host countries (Luiz et al., 2017). Naspers was initially driven to proximate markets 
incrementally with similarly weak institutions in line with the Uppsala model (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977), before moving further afield in an accelerated fashion but remaining focused on 
leveraging their emerging market expertise. Similar to the experience of the Multilatinas, the 
isolation of South Africa played a role in driving Naspers to pursue internationalisation as the 
home market moved towards saturation, together with the impact of economic liberalisation 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). EMNEs may have superior ability to learn from their mistakes and 
navigate risky ecosystems and to leverage knowledge between emerging markets (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Deng, 2012). The case of Naspers, in addition, reveals the opportunities 
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provided by new technologies to accelerate the processes of internationalization and to take 
advantage of new markets. 
The research focused on the historical expansion of a single South African EMNE that has 
a footprint in 130 countries with the limitations that go with a case study. The choice of Naspers, 
as a case study, has both advantages and disadvantages in terms of limitations, both related to the 
home country institutional setting and to the nature of the company itself and its focus on media 
technology. The South African setting and its rapid liberalisation and integration into the global 
economy in the early 1990s has distinct parallels with emerging markets elsewhere. Its experience 
therefore resembles that of EMNEs in other regions such as the Multilatinas and their navigation 
between emerging markets. Naspers’ focus on the media technology sector and its exploitation of 
new technologies to develop new product offerings in rapidly growing emerging markets, thereby 
disrupting the status quo, has boundary conditions in terms of limiting the generalisability of our 
findings. These technologies facilitated rapid internationalisation and the development of new 
product offerings and this may limit its comparison with other, more traditional sectors. 
Future research could provide comparison with other emerging markets that have seen 
liberalisation in the last three decades, most notably the BRIC countries, to further compare 
similarities and dissimilarities. We have provided some juxtaposition with the Multilatinas and 
more emerging market comparative work would provide further evidence for theorisation about 
the internationalisation of EMNEs. Furthermore, our research was embedded in a very distinctive 
technology sector and studies on both cognate and different sectors would allow us to explore the 
extent to which our results are driven by the peculiarities of the technology. Additionally, our case 
was of an EMNE successfully internationalising based upon its output capabilities, which focuses 
on the utilisation of current knowledge to its maximum extent across its network, but Awate et al. 
(2012) warn that EMNEs’ innovation catch-up is likely to be a slower and longer process, and 
thus studying how EMNEs transition from output to innovation capabilities is an important area 
for future research. Lastly, our focus was on institutional complementarities but Naspers 
demonstrates important patterns related to entrepreneurial management and how it extends across 
the EMNE networks, which should be further pursued. 
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Table 1: Profile of respondents  
Respondent Position Relationship to 
Group 
Industry Region  Gender 
1. Strategy and 
Research Analyst  
Parent 
Company  
N/A 130+ Countries Male 
2. Head of Business 
Development  
Parent 
Company  
N/A Asia Male 
3. Senior Product 
Manager  
Subsidiary  Ecommerce South Africa 
and Namibia 
Male 
4. Head of Analytics Parent 
Company 
N/A 130+ Countries Male 
5. CEO Subsidiary Video 
Entertainme
nt 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Male 
6. Head of Legal: 
MandA 
Parent N/A 130+ Countries Male 
7. Head of Group 
Strategy 
Parent N/A 130+ Countries Male 
8. Country Manager Subsidiary  FinTech EMEA Female 
9. Head of 
Performance 
Marketing  
Parent  N/A 130+ Countries Male 
10. General Manager Subsidiary Media Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Female 
11. Chief Technology 
Officer 
Subsidiary  Classifieds MEA Male 
12. Head of Strategy 
and Operations 
Subsidiary  Classifieds MEA Male 
13. Divisional CEO Subsidiary  Ecommerce South Africa 
and Namibia 
Male 
14. Head of Business 
Development and 
Operations 
Subsidiary Media Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Male 
15. SVP Product Parent  N/A 130+ Countries Male 
16. Strategic Initiatives 
Lead 
Subsidiary  Fintech EMEA Female 
17. Group CEO Listed Assets Multiple  Asia / Eastern 
Europe 
Male 
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Table 2: Chronological growth, technology expansion, and internationalization of Naspers, 
1915 to 2016 
Source: Naspers, 2017 
  
Date Industry Region Activity Phases of 
internationalisation 
1915 Newspapers South Africa Die Burger / Naspers 
launched 
Phase 1:  
South Africa focus. 
Close relationship 
forged with the 
apartheid rulers. 
1916 Magazines South Africa Huisgenoot launched 
1980s Media South Africa Print media portfolio 
expands 
1985 Pay-TV South Africa Pay-TV launched 
1991 Pay-TV Namibia, 
Botswana 
Expansion Phase 2:  
Internationalisation 
into Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Mid-
1990s 
Pay-TV Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Expansion 
1997 Internet services  South Africa Launched 
2001 Internet services China Tencent investment Phase 3: 
Internationalisation 
into emerging 
markets worldwide 
 
2006 Internet services Russia Mail.RU investment 
2006 Media and 
publishing 
Brazil Abril investment 
2009 Ecommerce Poland, Brazil Allegro / BuscaPe 
investments 
2010 Classifieds / 
FinTech 
UAE, South 
America, India 
Dubbizle / OLX / PayU 
investments 
2012 Ecommerce  India, CEE, UAE Flipkart / NetRetail / 
Souq investments 
2013 Ecommerce / 
Classifieds / 
Travel  
Nigeria / Russia / 
India 
Konga / Avito.RU / 
redBus investments 
2014 Classifieds / 
Business 
Intelligence 
South-East Asia / 
Eastern Europe / 
Israel 
OLX expansion / 
Similarweb acquisition 
2015 Video streaming Eastern Europe / 
Middle East / 
Africa 
Showmax launch 
2016 Educational 
technology 
Worldwide Code Academy / 
Udemy investments 
Phase 4: 
Internationalisation 
into the USA 
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Table 3: Naspers’ revenue per industry segment and geographic region 2002-2016 (as a % 
of total) 
 Revenue 2002 Revenue 2008 Revenue 2016 
Industry segment 
Video entertainment 57% 45% 28% 
Print media 28% 35% 5% 
Internet 10% 20% 67% 
Other 5%   
 Revenue 2008 Revenue 2016 
Geographic area 
South Africa 61% 23% 
Rest of Africa 13% 9% 
Europe 7% 15% 
Asia 6% 49% 
South America 11% 2% 
Other 2% 2% 
Source: Naspers, 2017 
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Table 4: Naspers group profile and structure stylised, 2016 
Global platform operator 
Internet Video entertainment Print 
Ecommerce 
C2C B2C  DTT DTH Other  
Classifieds Etail and 
marketplaces 
Online 
comparison 
shopping 
Payments New 
ventures 
Listed     
Examples 
OLX – 40 
countries 
Takealot – South 
Africa 
Buscapé – 
Latin 
America 
PayU – 
17 
emerging 
markets 
Movile – 
Latin 
America 
Mail.ru - 
Russia 
GoTV 
- 
Africa 
DSTV - 
Africa 
Showmax – 
65 countries 
Media 24 – 
Africa but 
mainly 
South 
Africa  
Avito - 
Russia 
eMAG – Eastern 
Europe 
  Ibibo 
Group - 
India 
Tencent - 
China 
 Multichoice 
- Africa 
Irdeto – 
Netherlands 
worldwide 
Novus 
holdings - 
southern 
Africa 
Dubizzle – 
MENA 
region 
Fashion Days – 
Eastern Europe 
   MakeMyTrip - 
India 
 Supersport 
- Africa 
  
 Flipkart – India     DeliveryHero 
– 40 countries 
    
Source: Naspers, 2017 
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Table 5: Socio-political and economic context of South Africa, 1910-2017 
Time period Socio-political context  Economic context 
1910-1948 • 1910 - South Africa formally becomes a country as a single 
union with Dominion status within the British Empire 
• Despite the two world wars, South Africa experiences 
relatively high growth, low inflation, and a focus on 
industrialisation. 
1948 – 1970 
 
• 1948 - National Party comes to power on an Apartheid mandate 
• The UK Prime Minister highlights UK discomfort with SA’s 
racial policies with his “winds of change” speech. 
• SA becomes a republic and withdraws from the Commonwealth.  
• Prime Minister Verwoerd bans the ANC and other black 
political organizations.  
• The 1950s and 60s see a period of relatively high 
economic growth, low inflation, controlled fiscal 
spending, and increasing industrialization. 
• A policy of import substituting industrialization is 
promoted. 
• “Separate development” along racial groupings is 
administered through the Homeland system. 
1970-1980 
 
• Fourteen heads of African states release the Lusaka 
Manifesto in which they pledge support for banned anti-
Apartheid organizations. 
• Various countries suspend cultural and sports agreements 
with SA. 
• Killings of anti-Apartheid activists increase. 
• The oil crisis of 1973 results in labor unrest. 
• The macro-economic costs of apartheid become more 
apparent with a growth slowdown.  
• Macroeconomic conditions worsen. 
1980 – 1989 
 
• Mass civil society unrest occurs as anti-Apartheid actions 
are increasingly well-coordinated.  
• The United Democratic Front is established to coordinate the 
actions of churches, civic associations, trade unions, student 
organizations, sports bodies and others to oppose Apartheid. 
 
• The rising economic costs of apartheid put pressure 
on the fiscus with increasing debt levels. 
• South African business enters talks with exiled ANC. 
• International sanctions and disinvestment. 
• Macroeconomic conditions deteriorate substantially. 
1989 – 1994  
 
• President De Klerk unbans the ANC and frees Mandela after 
27 years in prison.  
• Negotiations about ending Apartheid.  
• The global community starts reengaging with SA.  
• Economic collapse is imminent as result of an 
economic slowdown and rapidly increasing debt 
levels.  
 
President 
Mandela 
1994 – 1999 
• The ANC wins the first democratic elections with close to a 
two-thirds majority. 
• SA rejoins international bodies. 
• Reintegration of South Africa into the global 
economy and liberalization of the economy. 
• Economic focus on meeting basic needs of those 
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Time period Socio-political context  Economic context 
• SA’s progressive constitution is signed into law. previously deprived under apartheid.  
• Some improvement is seen in macroeconomic 
conditions. 
President 
Mbeki 
1999 – 2008 
 
• Mbeki focuses on a technocratic state and improving state 
capacity but the first major post-Apartheid corruption 
scandal is exposed, an arms deal championed by Mbeki. 
Mbeki attracts widespread criticism for his AIDS denialism. 
• Zuma, the deputy-president, is implicated in corruption 
charges.  
• The GEAR (Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution) policy with a focus on stabilization, 
reduction of debt, and market reforms are 
implemented. 
• Macroeconomic conditions improve substantially. 
President 
Zuma 
2009 – 2017 
 
• The Nkandla scandal highlights Zuma’s use of state funds for 
the development of his private residence. 
• Growing corruption and problems of governance within state-
owned enterprises is experienced. 
• The Marikana massacre takes place.  
• Rise of populist agendas. 
• Large-scale electricity blackouts take place. 
• South Africa is severely affected by the economic crisis 
worldwide with deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. 
Source: Adapted from Barnard and Luiz, 2018. 
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Table 6: Illustrated data from themes emanating from interviews 
Themes Illustrative quotes 
1. Internationalising 
off  institutional 
complementarity 
“Definitely it helps a lot to have a company from an emerging market going into another emerging market” (respondent 1). 
“I think it's risk appetite, so they know that they're going into market where there's substantial risk but I think there's also a certain level of 
flexibility which a Western conglomerate could not afford” (respondent 3). 
“There definitely is an advantage coming out of emerging market, you start to understand what those emerging market problems are and how to 
overcome them. And you know you go into one difficult territory and may learn a lot of things about yourself and about the business from that 
experience. First world businesses never experienced those problems; some people just don't know how to overcome them” (respondent 5). 
“I think Naspers guys were sort of brought up tough, you need to have slightly robust approach when you invest in emerging markets and we 
were open to that you know. … We've had a lot of experience in emerging markets we've learned how to be quite flexible and creative and 
adapting to those environments” (respondent 6). 
2. Capitalising upon 
the lack of 
competition 
“So because emerging markets are high risk and the level of corporate investments is sometimes a little lower than into established markets; so 
the makeup of the competitors will generally be smaller and more entrepreneurial types in those emerging markets than the bigger corporates” 
(respondent 3). 
“A key part of that as well is that they had started the expansion into the internet early enough. You know that was kind of mid to late 90's, 97 
around there and in internet terms that was very early days still. So obviously the first mover advantage there was significant” (respondent 4). 
“I think first-mover advantage is aggressiveness, being able to go deep and invest for the long term because it takes a lot of time in these 
emerging markets” (respondent 7). 
“… went into emerging markets because there wasn't as much rivalry” (respondent 14). 
3. Leveraging off 
Naspers as an 
ecosystem 
“… get into the market through another company that is already established or through networks that you already have” (respondent 1). 
“Moving into a few other countries I think it’s usually beneficial having been part of the wider group … The benefit of a larger group is that 
you can depend on each of the other entities and you could look for certain areas of synergy and areas that you can centralize” (respondent 8). 
4. Embracing 
disruptive innovation 
for new market 
opportunities 
“One thing is given is that the way consumers behave today it's not going to be the way consumers behave tomorrow and tomorrow is one year, 
five years, ten years from now. Wouldn't it be great if you can manipulate that time span and the only way to do that is to allow one to disrupt 
yourself?” (respondent 13). 
“I mean our industry is in a complete state of flux. There is huge unknowns, huge uncertainties. What we do know is that you know great 
content needs to live somewhere … We need to own distribution because it is a key to the revenue. But within that itself, it is the problem 
because then you face off against the platform of Google and Facebook which is the sort of like, I name it or call it the Elephant in the Room. It 
is sort of like in your face kind of scenarios and once we have acknowledge this, we still believe that if you create the right utility, you know 
something will resonate” (respondent 14). 
“I think the decision initially for investing in some of things was not necessarily so much tied to any specific technology but rather the broader 
impact of a technology in a number of manifestations that it is going to affect” (respondent 15).  
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Figure 1: EMNE exploitation of complementarities and technologies for accelerated internationalisation  
Home country 
context /
experience
Complementarity
Exploitation of 
technologies 
for new market 
opportunities
Accelerated 
internationalisation
Reinforcing emerging market learning process
Institutional
Market 
opportunities
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1
 Whilst table 4 provides a stylised summary, the full detail on the global corporate structure and subsidiaries with its worldwide investments and shareholdings, and its 
complex organogram are available from the authors upon request and not included because of space constraints. 
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